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INTRODUCTION 
You know the old saying, "Don't cry over spilled milk." Well 
there certainly has been a lot of crying over spilled coffee in the last 
year, specifically scalding hot McDonald's coffee. The crying has 
been primarily by talk show hosts, journalists and politicians, a cry of 
outrage to reform the tort system, with Stella Liebeck's spilled 
coffee! as the flagship case. 
Reporting selective facts of a case may easily enrage the public. 
Take for example the voice-over introduction from CNN's news 
talkshow "Crossfire": "What's going on? ... In recent days, there 
was a ... $2.9-million award against McDonald's for a case 
involving a hot coffee spill by a drive-in customer."2 This narrative 
• Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University. B.A. 
1967, Michigan State University; M.A. 1970, Eastern Michigan University; J.D. 1977, Detroit 
College of Law; LL.M. 1981, University of Michigan. The author gratefully acknowledges 
the outstanding research assistance of Jody Sturtz. 
1. Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, No. CV-930-2419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. 
Dist. 1994). The facts of the case as reported by numerous sources are as follows. On the 
morning of February 27, 1992, as a seated passenger in her grandson's parked car, 79-year-
old Stella Liebeck placed a cup of McDonald's coffee between her knees to remove the lid. 
She took this action because the Ford Probe was not equipped with a cup holder and the 
dashboard was slanted. As she tugged to remove the lid, the scalding coffee spilled into her 
lap. Before her grandson could help her get out of the bucket seat, the 170 degree coffee had 
caused second and third-degree burns to her buttocks, thighs and labia. Mrs. Liebeck spent 
seven days in the hospital, three weeks recuperating at home, and then had to return to the 
hospital for skin grafts. The burns and the grafts were extremely painful. Are Lawyers 
Burning America? NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1995, at 33. 
2. Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, Sept. 2, 1994). The introduction also 
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implies that Mrs. Liebeck was driving at the time and she was not. 
The introduction omitted essential facts surrounding the case such as: 
the severity of her injuries, the length of her initial hospitalization 
(seven days), and the fact that extensive skins grafts were required. 
Nor does it acknowledge McDonald's admission that it had not 
lowered the 170 degree temperature of its coffee, despite having 
received over 700 burn complaints in a ten year period.3 The jurors' 
initial reaction to the case was similar to that of the public. One juror 
recalled that she thought it was a ridiculous case, while another juror 
initially thought the case was frivolous.4 However, after listening to 
all the testimony and both versions of the facts, the jury awarded 
( compensatory damages of $200,000, reduced by 20% for Mrs. 
Liebeck's comparative negligence.s The jury awarded $2.7 million 
in punitive damages, the equivalent of two days receipts from the sale 
of McDonald's coffee. Subsequently, the trial judge reduced the 
punitive damage award to $480,000, three times the compensatory 
damages.6 
Have judges and jurors gone wild? Do we need to drastically 
change or reform our civil tort damage system? Most commentators 
referred to the Domino's pizza delivery case and the Dow Coming breast-implant settlement, 
as follows: 
"What's going on? There have been a lot of very large lawsuit awards lately, 
ranging up to $79 million in an individual award against Domino's for an auto 
accident involving one of its delivery cars. In recent days, there was a $4.25 
biIIion settlement in a breast-implant case and $2.9 million award against 
McDonald's for a case involving a hot coffee spill by a drive-in customer. Have 
lawsuits gotten out of control?" Id. 
3. Are Lawyers Burning America?, supra note 1, at 35. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. Defense counsel argued to the jury that Mrs. Liebeck only had herself to 
blame for the accident. However, even if putting the cup between her knees was not the 
most reasonable course of conduct, the jury had to decide whether McDonald's negligent 
conduct in selling coffee at a temperature capable of causing second-degree bums within 
three seconds of hitting the skin was a cause in fact and a proximate cause of Mrs. Liebeck's 
injuries. The jury obviously decided that McDonald's conduct was a substantial factor. Id. 
6. As will be discussed, much of the present tort reform movement is aimed at 
eliminating or reducing punitive damages. The "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 
1995," addresses the concern over punitive damages by capping punitive damages at 
$250,000 or three times the amount of compensatory damages awarded, whichever is larger. 
H.R. REP. No. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 107(B) (Ninth Version June 26, 1995). The 
trial judge in the Liebeckcase used this formula. Punitive damages are seldomly awarded, 
and only in cases where the defendant's conduct is willful, wanton, or intentional. Punitive 
damages are designed to punish and to deter, and only when the evidence sufficiently alleges 
such conduct will the judge permit the jury to receive a punitive damage instruction. 
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today recommend radically changing the way the tort system operates, 
perhaps replacing it altogether with a first-party insurance system1 
funded by individuals or the government. 
Radical change is not necessary. In fact, it could defeat the basic 
purposes that underlie our present system, compensating the plaintiff 
for injury and deterring future undesirable conduct. The problem is 
the American public's perception of the tort system, not the system 
itself. The public's misperception is fostered by the media and 
politicians. "Beliefs about jury behavior, more than any other single 
factor, seem to have fueled tort reform.,,8 
Jury verdicts are easily viewed as ludicrous or outrageous. But 
these conclusions are reached without considering all the evidence the 
jury used in its deliberation. Furthermore, jury discretion is not 
unbridled. The trial judge controls a jury's outrage and passion by 
remitting excessive verdicts. 9 
The first section of this article will examine the development of 
tort liability, the history of tort reform, and the present tort reform 
solutions. The article will discuss the advantage of our present 
system, relying on jury adjudication as an essential dement in 
reaching a fair resolution. Current tort reform hampers what is right 
about the present system by limiting the jury's role. As Professor 
Wells artfully concluded in her seminal law review article justifying 
jury adjudication, the value of the tort system is in its quest for 
individual justice. "[F]aimess is an important aspiration for tort law 
and case-specific consensus decisionmaking is essential to achieving 
fair outcomes."IO 
7. See Stephen Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 555 (1985); 
Jeffrey O'Connell, A "Neo-No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: PreaccidentGuarantees of 
PostaccidentSettlementOffers,73 CAL. L. REv. 898 (1985); George L. Priest, Modern Tort 
Law and Its Reform, 22 VAL. U. L. REv. 1 (1987). 
8. Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, "OjJto the Races": The 1980's Tort Crisis and 
the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REv. 207,248 (1990). 
9. The judicial power ofthe remittitur makes statutory caps on damages unnecessary 
and, with cases involving severe injuries and young plaintiffs, unfair. See Robert L. Rabin, 
Some Reflectionson the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 13,40 (1988). 
10. Catharine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A PragmaticJustijica-
tionfor Jury Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2413 (1990). Professor Wells' article 
argues that fairness is a better justification for corrective justice than fault. "The central issue 
in a tort case is not whether the defendant is at fault but whether the defendant can fairly be 
held financially responsible for the plaintiffs injuries. . .. The central element of the 
conception [of corrective justice] is fairness rather than fault." Id. at 2358-59. 
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The second section of the article asserts that morality-based tort 
reform would foster an improved public perception of the law. Not 
only does the public distrust juries, judges, and lawyers, the public 
frequently views the law as being senseless, immoral, and unjust. A 
valid objective for true tort reform would be to change the law in 
ways that reflect community norms and values and a sense of 
collective morality. II "The law can be a positive force in encourag-
ing and improving social relations, rather than reinforcing our 
divisions, disparities of power, and isolation."12 Tort reform should 
strive for morality-based law that encourages positive conduct, rather 
than seek to reduce the frequency and size of judgments. 13 This 
type of tort reform would make "common sense" and improve the 
public's perception of the law. 
This article proposes changing the "no duty to aid" rule as a 
beginning for morality-based tort reform. During the same thirty year 
period that Congress and state legislatures have been reforming 
modern tort law, commentators have consistently recommended 
changing the substantive law rule requiring no affirmative aid to 
strangers in peril. Too frequently the media reports that a victim of 
crime was brutalized while bystanders observed without helping.14 
The Kitty Genovese murderls in 1964, observed by thirty-eight of 
11. Id. at 2399. Morality based law faces an up-hill battle because of perceptions 
that morality is individualized and represents social and economic bias. The legal pragmatist, 
however, sees the source of moral judgment as "a communal property of human experience 
rather than a distinctly individual response to surrounding circumstances." Id. (discussing 
Hume's moral theory and how it justifies the collective judgments of juries made free from 
the distortions of perspective and bias). Whether the suspicion is justified or not, morality 
is the basis of many modem laws. One example is the laws against drunk drivers which have 
so pervasive an effect as to enter the Bankruptcy Code in the form of an exception to 
discharge for a tort judgment based upon facts where the defendant was intoxicated. 
12. Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 3,31 (1988). 
13. It appears that the only goals for reform in the 1980's and 1990's is to reduce the 
dollar amount that defendants spend. "[T]he real heart of the present crisis may be money." 
Michael J. Saks, If There be a Crisis: How Shall We Know It?, 46 MD. L. REv. 63, 72 
(1986). 
14. One Charged in Beating Death of Man, DET. NEWS, July 26, 1995, at 1 D. The 
story reports that the deceased victim's brother is "trying to understand how several people 
could have done nothing to help while his brother Dean lay badly beaten on a lawn for 
hours." Tom Curley, Anger, Disbelief Swirling After DetroitAttack, USA TODAY, Aug. 23, 
1995, at 3A. "Detroit residents are struggling to make sense of the death of a woman who 
jumped from a bridge to flee an assailant as a crowd looked on." Id .. 
15. Martin Gansberg, 38 Who Saw MurderDidn't Call the Police, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
15, 1964, at At. 
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her neighbors, fueled significant debate about the rule, including a 
1965 symposium at the University of Chicago. 16 
Then in 1983, a Massachusetts woman was repeatedly raped in 
a tavern while at least fifteen patrons observed. 17 . Nevertheless, tort 
reform focused on automobile negligence and medical malpractice 
crises, and ignored the "no duty to aid" rule. Tort reform in the mid 
1980's, fostered by a perceived insurance crisis, did not address the 
rule despite voiced public concern. 
Admittedly, a change in the "no duty to aid rule" would probably 
have little or no impact on the nation's economy. IS It is doubtful 
that it would affect litigation or jury verdicts. What it could do is 
start a trend in law reform aimed at the law being a positive force in 
our everyday lives. 
I. MODERN TORT LAW AND REFORM 
A. History of Recent Tort Law 
Tort law as we know it today, founded primarily upon a fault-
based negligence cause of action, is relatively new, less than 150 
years old. Legal historians generally regard the case of Brown v. 
Kendall,19 as the case which abandoned strict liability for direct, 
forcible injury (trespass) and replaced it with a fault based (negli-
gence) system in the United States. In Brown, the defendant 
attempted to separate two fighting dogs with a stick and hit the 
plaintiff in the eye.20 In ordering a new trial based upon erroneous 
instructions at the trial court level, the appellate court held, 
[I]f it appears that the defendant was doing a lawful act, and unintentional-
ly hit and hurt the plaintiff, then unless it also appears to the satisfaction 
of the jury, that the defendant is chargeable with some fault, negligence, 
16. The University of Chicago Law School sponsored a "Conference on the Good 
Samaritan and the Bad -- the Law and Morality of Volunteering in Situations of Peril, or of 
Failing to Do So." Robert A. Prentice, Expanding the Duty to Rescue, 19 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REv. 15, 15 n.4 (1985). 
17. This Massachusetts case was the basis for a movie starring Jodie Foster. Her 
performance in "The Accused" won her acclaim and an academy award. The law remained 
unchanged. 
18. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. 
19. 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850). 
20. Brown, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) at 292. 
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carelessness, or want or prudence, the plaintiff fails to sustain the burden 
of proof, and is not entitled to recover.21 
Whether this shift in the law was adopted to protect developing 
industry in this country, or out of sympathy for the injured victim, has 
been debated. 22 
It was during the second half of the nineteenth century that 
American lawyers started using the word "tort" as a single concept 
covering all liability imposed for personal injury suffered by the 
plaintiff resulting from the defendant's wrongful acts. 23 This new 
theory of tort liability based on the universal, scientific nature of the 
law, was designed to cover all situations. Accordingly, judges 
believed they could apply rules of law with mathematical certainty. 
The post-Civil War judicial product seems to start from the assumption that 
the law is a closed, logical system. Judges do not make law: they merely 
declare the law which, in some Platonic sense, already exists. The judicial 
function has nothing to do with the adaptation of rules of law to changing 
conditions; it is restricted to the discovery of what the true rules of law are 
and indeed always have been. Past error can be exposed and in that way 
minor corrections can be made, but the truth, once arrived at, is immutable 
and eternal. Change can only be legislative and even legislative change 
will be treated with a wary and hostile distrust.24 
From Brown until after World War I, American tort jurisprudence 
focused on the reasonably prudent person standard applied routinely 
without muchconcem for the facts at hand. During this period, the 
doctrine of negligence as a matter of law developed,25 permitting 
judges to frame universal standards of behavior constituting negli-
gence. An infamous Holmes opinion held that it was contributory 
negligence as a matter of law not to get out of the car at a railroad 
21. [d. at 298. 
22. The older, more common view saw the change as protective of developing 
industries including the railroads. Charles Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute 
Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359 (1951). For the opposing view see Gary Schwartz, The 
Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REv. 641 (1989). A third view is that 
a universal negligence standard for liability marks the beginning of an attempt to make the 
law like science and create universal rules. SeeG. EDWARD WHIlE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 
(1980). For a critical, yet entertaining -examination of law as a science in our jurisprudence, 
during the time period from the Civil War through World War I, see GRANT Gn.MORE, THE 
AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977). 
23. Gn.MORE, supra note 22, at 46. 
24. [d. at 62. 
25. See W. PAGE KEEToN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEEToN ON 1lIE LAW OF TORTS § 
35, at 217-19 (5th ed. 1984). 
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crossing and walk to the edge of the tracks where there was no clear 
view of the tracks.26 
During this period, tort law remained stable with contributory 
negligence, assumption of the risk, and the fellow servant rule 
predominating as defensesY The first major tort reform of the 
twentieth century removed the case of the injured employee from the 
tort arena when statutory workers' compensation schemes were 
adopted. The no-fault workers' compensation system was the 
beginning of compulsory first-party'insurance systems as a replace-
ment for the tort arena. 
The other area of reform during the first half of the twentieth 
century involved product liability. As a result of misreading 
Winterbottom v. Wright,28 courts required a plaintiff to be in privity . 
of contract with a defendant in order to recover when the defendant's 
negligence in manufacturing a product caused the plaintiff personal 
injury. American jurisprudence followed the English case, and held 
that a lack of privity barred recovery by the plaintiff based on the 
defendant's active negligence.29 
In 1916, Judge Cardozo authored the landmark opinion that 
established negligence as a viable cause of action to recover against 
a manufacturer when a defective product causes personal injury. In 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor CO.,30 the court held the manufacturer 
of an automobile liable to the purchaser where the wheel had 
collapsed. Foreseeable danger resulting from a manufacturer's 
negligence resulted in liability to the plaintiff; privity was not 
required. 
Therefore, up until the 1960's, negligence was the predominant 
tort cause of action, regardless of the facts presented, and contributory 
negligence on the part of the plaintiff was the premiere defense, since 
even a scintilla of negligence on the part of the plaintiff barred 
recovery.3) The bar of contributory negligence caused plaintiffs the 
greatest difficulty, and commentators denounced its lack of fair-
ness.32 
26. Baltimore & Ohio RR. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). 
27. KEEToN, supra note 25, § 65 at 451. 
28. 10 M. W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. PI. 1842). In that case the plaintiff 
coachman was thrown from the coach and seriously injured because the defendant neglected 
to repair the coach under a contract with the plaintiff's employer. 
29. See Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873). 
30. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
31. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 463,467 (1965). 
32. Leon Green, Illinois Negligence Law, 39 ILL. L. REv. 36, 116, 197 (1944); 
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Contributory negligence created some obstacles in product liability 
cases based upon negligence. Probably the greatest obstacle in these 
cases, however, was the plaintiff s inability to point to specific 
conduct establishing the defendant-manufacturer's breach of duty. As 
a result, the doctrine of res ipsa loquiW3 became essential to permit 
a jury to infer from the circumstances the defendant's negligent 
conduct. The doctrine has been the source of some considerable 
trouble to the COurtS.34 Furthermore, the doctrine was inapplicable 
in some cases because the plaintiff could not establish the defendant's 
exclusive control, or eliminate other potential negligent causes of the 
harm. 
Two dramatic changes in tort law developed to address these 
problems and to help plaintiffs recover. First, in 1963, the California 
Supreme Court decided Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,35 
announcing a tort standard of strict product liability which eliminated 
a warranty basis. 
To establish the manufacturer's liability it was sufficient that plaintiff 
proved that he was injured while using the Shopsmith in a way intended 
to be used as a result of a defect in design and manufacture of which 
plaintiff was not aware that made the Shopsmith unsafe for its intended 
use.36 
Within two years, Section 402A of the Restatement Second of 
Torts37 reformulated the rule announced in Greenman and within a 
Robert A. Leflar, Declining Defense of Contributory Negligence, 1 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1946); 
Fleming James, Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691 (1953); Wex S. Malone, Some 
Ruminations on Contributory Negligence, 65 UTAH L. REv. 91, 106-08 (1981). 
Id. 
33. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328 D(I) (1965). 
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence 
of the defendant when 
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of 
negligence; 
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third 
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and 
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the 
plaintiff. 
34. William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitor, 20 MINN. L. 
REv. 241, 271 (1936). See Potomac Edison Co. v. Johnson, 152 A. 633 (Md. 1930) (Bond, 
C.J., dissenting). Further, the State of South Carolina still refuses to adopt the doctrine. Orr 
v. Saylor, 169 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1969); Legette v. Smith, 220 S.E.2d 429 (S.C. 1975). 
35. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
36. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901. 
37. Section 402A provides: 
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decade, a majority of jurisdictions adopted the strict product liability 
standard of 402A. 38 
The second major substantive law reform also began in earnest in 
the 1960's.39 Contributory negligence as a bar to a plaintiffs 
recovery was replaced by a comparative negligence scheme, which 
permitted a reduction in recovery based upon the plaintiff s relative 
fault. By the mid-1980's a majority of jurisdictions had adopted pure 
or modified comparative negligence.4o 
B. Tort Reform of Modem Tort Law 
The year 1960 or 1965 is usually cited as the beginning of modem 
tort law.41 Assuming that these major changes in substantive tort 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to 
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm 
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial 
change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his 
product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any 
contractual relation with the seller. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
38. S.ee 1 IERRV I. PHILLIPS & ROBERT E. PRvOR, PRODUCTS LIABll.1TY § 1-8(d), at 
75-79 (2d ed. 1993). 
39. Technically, several federal statutes had been applying a comparative negligence, 
reduction in recovery based upon a comparative fault standard for years. For example, in 
1908, the Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988) was enacted. See a/so the 
Iones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988). 
40. With pure comparative negligence, a plaintiff's contributory negligence does not 
operate to bar his recovery altogether, but does serve to reduce his damages in proportion to 
his fault. KEEToN, supra note 25, § 67 at 472. Under modified comparative negligence, a 
plaintiffs contributory negligence does not bar recovery so long as it remains below a 
specified proportion of total fault, usually 50 or 51 percent. Id at 473. For a list of 
jurisdictions adopting pure and modified comparative negligence, see Id at 471-73 nn.28, 31, 
39 & 40. Even in 1983 only ten states retained the doctrine of contributory negligence 
(Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia). Id at 471 n.30. 
41. 1965 is a logical point because it marks the adoption of the Restatement Second 
of Torts and Section 402A. The year 1965 also marks the publication of Robert Keeton and 
Ieffrey O'Connell's comprehensive proposal for no-fault automobile insurance. ROBERT E. 
KEEToN & IEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR TIm TRAFFIC VICTIM: A 
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965). Professor Schwartz 
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law started during the 1960's, it is fair to say that an attempt to 
reform the new rules began soon thereafter. The battle-cry of tort 
reformers through the last three decades has been "litigation explo-
sion," a concern that too many lawsuits are filed. Undoubtedly, the 
adoption of 402A strict product liability and comparative negligence 
increased the number of valid complaints. The plaintiff no longer had 
to prove specific negligent conduct on the part of the manufacturer. 
Nor would a slight amount of negligence on the part of the plaintiff 
bar recovery. But whether the adoption of these substantive rules 
created a "litigation explosion" is questionable. 
The first major solution· to the litigation explosion was the 
adoption of "no-fault" automobile insurance in a majority of the 
states.42 The basic idea behind automobile no-fault is to replace 
third-party liability insurance coverage with first party coverage. 
Third-party tort liability coverage would only be retained for large 
claims that involved more than property damage. The major 
arguments supporting adoption of no-fault were: (1) minor automo-
bile accidents were clogging the judicial dockets; (2) fault was 
extremely difficult to determine in many cases; and (3) a first-party 
insurance system would be more efficient than third-party insurance. 
The efficiency would be demonstrated by lower insurance rates and 
higher percentages of payout per insurance premium dollar.43 Most 
jurisdictions adopting no-fault did so by 1975.44 
Again dvring the 1970's tort reformers complained about the 
"litigation explosion." This lament was made despite the fact that in 
many jurisdictions filings had decreased because many' automobile 
negligence cases were removed from the tort arena.45 The major 
areas of crises appeared to be medical malpractice and product 
liability. 
With respect to the area of medical malpractice, it is interesting 
to note that the major substantive changes could not have affected the 
chronicles the rise of modem American tort law from 1960. Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality 
of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REv. 963 (1983). 
42. Roger C. Henderson, No-Fault Insurancefor Automobile Accidents: Status and 
Effect in the United States, 56 OR. L. REv. 287 (1977). The states' plans vary dramatically 
from plans having virtually no impact on tort litigation involving automobiles to plans that . 
limit access to the tort arena to serious injury cases. 
43. Id. at 304. 
44. Id at 288. By 1977, 24 states had adopted some form of no-fault automobile 
insurance and several other states were considering legislation. Id. 
45. See Christopher 1. Bruce, The Deterrent Effects of Automobile Insurance and 
Tort Law: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 6 LAW & POL'y 67 (Jan. 1984). 
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number of malpractice claims filed. The strict product liability cause 
of action is not relevant to medical malpractice claims, except with 
respect to a possible third-party claim against a manufacturer of 
medical equipment, hardware, or pharmaceuticals.46 Clearly, 
medical malpractice cases are based in negligence, not strict liability, 
and the standard of care is a professional one,47 requiring expert 
testimony in the overwhelming majority of cases to establish a breach 
of that standard of care.48 Additionally, the adoption of comparative 
negligence would rarely impact the outcome in a medical malpractice 
case, since the plaintiff-patient puts her care and well-being in the 
hands of the professional health provider. 
In an effort to deal with the malpractice crisis of the 1970' s, some 
jurisdictions adopted mandatory arbitration or malpractice disclosure 
panels.49 Other jurisdictions adopted caps on damages, mandatory 
46. Strict products liability usually applies only to one who sells a product. See 
REsTA TEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. A physician usually does not sell products, but 
performs services. 
47. The modem trend is toward a national standard of care which requires that "a 
physician must exercise that degree of care, skill and proficiency exercised by reasonably 
careful, skiIIful, and prudent practitioners in the same class to which he belongs, acting under 
the same or similar circumstances." Vergara v. Doan, 593 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Ind. 1992). 
Michigan standard jury instructions sets forth the standard of care as: 
When I use the words "professional negligence" or "malpractice" with respect to 
the defendant's conduct, I mean the failure to do something which a [doctor] of 
ordinary learning, judgment or skiII in [this community or a similar one/ __ _ 
____ -I] would do, or the doing of something which a [doctor] of ordinary 
learning, judgment or skill would not do, under the same or similar circumstances 
you find to exist in this case. 
It is for you to decide, based upon the evidence, what the ordinary [doctor] of 
ordinary learning, judgment or skill would do or would not do under the same or 
similar circumstances. 
MICHIGAN STANDARD JURY INSTRUcnONS (SECOND) 30.01 (ICLE, 1995 Supp.). 
48. Ordinary negligence cannot be inferred simply from an undesirable result. Expert 
testimony is required to establish the breach unless any layperson is competent to conclude 
from common experience that such things do not happen if there has been proper skill and 
care. KEEToN, supra note 25, § 32 at 188-89. Unfortunately, an excellent example of a case 
where "layperson's experience would be sufficient" was reported this past year in Grand 
Rapids, Michigan at Butterworth Hospital. In that case, the physician removed the wrong 
breast while performing a mastectomy on a cancer patient. Joyce Price, Mistake Stirs Worry 
Over Hospital Care Incompetence 'Epidemic 'in U.S. Charged, WASH. TiMEs, June 11,1995, 
at A3. See also Deborah Sharp, Errors Renew Call For Doctor Review, USA TODAY, Mar. 
27, 1995, at lA (doctor amputating the wrong leg). 
49. Jim M. Perdue, The Law of Texas Medical Malpractice, 22 Hous. L. REv. 1 
(1985). See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.4903(1) (West 1982); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 24 § 2854 (West 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 7002 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. 
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offset of collateral benefits, shorter statutes of limitation, and 
limitations on attorneys' contingency fees. 50 One study showed 
these changes reducing the mean value of the awards. 5 I Interesting-
ly, another study illustrated that 1970's tort reform did not reduce 
insurance premiums. 52 Binding arbitration, however, increased the 
frequency of claims, primarily by encouraging smaller claims. 53 
Was the medical malpractice crisis caused by frivolous lawsuits, 
too many attorneys, or too many negligent health care providers? 
There is very little data to support any theory. Surely one reason for 
increased medical malpractice costs is that parties injured by physician 
negligence are more likely to survive today, thereby incurring more 
economic and non-economic damages. When medical malpractice 
results in a wrongful death claim, the size of the judgment diminishes. 
Clearly, scientific advancements save more lives, potentially 
causing more long-term damages for care, pain, and suffering. 54 
Larger jury awards reflecting increases in damages, therefore, are not 
irrational. Scientific advancements that increase life and its relative 
care and pain do not justify capping verdicts in medical malpractice 
cases. Caps may reduce the variance in insurance risk pools and the 
range of potential liability outcomes,55 but at what cost to individual 
well-being? Caps on jury verdicts in medical malpractice cases 
impact most significantly seriously injured and young plaintiffs. 
Additionally, several new causes of action and theories of medical 
malpractice were created, increasing potential exposure of health care 
providers. Wrongful birth,56 birth trauma, failure to timely diagnose, 
§ 8.01-581.2 (Michie 1990) (requiring notice to health care providers prior to commencing 
a malpractice action). 
50. PATRICIA MUNCH DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL 
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS (1982). 
51. Id. For a study showing 1970's tort reform did not reduce insurance premiums, 
see Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance "Crises" of the 1970s: An 
Empirical Assessment, 91. REALm POL. POL'y & LAW 629 (1985). 
52. Id. 
53. PATRICIA MUNCH DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 198-224 (1985). 
54. This is reflected in one commentator's statement: 
If a large fraction of damages is for the cost of medical care and rehabilitation, 
then awards are not rising if they merely track the rate of health cost inflation. To 
the degree that medicine and other emergency services have improved their ability 
to rescue people and prolong life, that may raise costs Justifiably. 
Saks, supra note 13, at 73. 
55. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE 
L.1. 1521, 1588 (1987). 
56. Wrongful birth cases, for instance, are a recent phenomenon, 
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and informed consent are just a few examples. New technology, such 
as kidney dialysis machines, also generate potential malpractice 
claims. S7 While also creating potential claims against the manufac-
turer for defective design and production flaws, new technology 
additionally creates potential liability against the health care provider 
for negligently using the technology. 
Product liability was the other area of concern for tort reformers 
in the 1970's. The major concern stemmed from design defect cases 
and whether manufacturers would be liable for injuries caused by a 
defective design that could only be viewed as defective retrospective-
ly. In other words, courts were asked to decide whether strict product 
liability was truly liability without fault or knowledge. If a product 
was designed as safely as possible based on available knowledge, 
could the manufacturer be held liable if the design subsequently 
injured the plaintiff?s8 
No, answered the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, rejecting 
the hindsight approach to risk-utility balancings9 in determining 
whether the utility of the products design outweighed its potential 
risks. Almost universally, jurisdictions adopted the negligence risk-
utility balance approach, holding the manufacturer accountable only 
for risks known at the time of distribution of the product.60 Adop-
possible only as a result of the development of new medical 
technology and the legalization of abortion. If states allowed 
recovery for full economic and emotional harm, these cases 
potentially might produce significantly large judgments. 
Accordingly, any interpretation of changes in the size of 
damage awards against obstetricians must account for these 
other factors. 
Sanders & Joyce, supra note 8, at 229. 
57. Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Non Durable Precau-
tions. and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 293 (1988). 
58. This liability has been referred to as superstrict liability, and it was rejected in 
most jurisdictions. Even New Jersey, which applied the doctrine to an asbestos manufacturer 
in Beshada v. John-MansvilleProds. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982), subsequently reversed 
itself in Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). 
59. Under this approach, a manufacturer is strictly liable, even if she could not 
reasonably know of the risks when the product was distributed, if the utility of the product 
does not outweigh the risks known at the time of trial. 
60. See John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable 
Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.D. L. REv. 734 (1983). Michigan adopted the time-of-
distribution approach to risk-utility balancing, stating emphatically that it was adopting the 
negligence risk-utility test for product liability, design defect cases. Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 
421 Mich. 670, 690-91, 365 N.W.2d 176, 185-86 (1984). 
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tion of this test injected negligence into the strict product claim, 
making it much more difficult for plaintiffs to prove design defects 
and to recover damages. 
Despite these changes, the tort reform relief of the 1970' s proved 
inadequate to prevent the alleged insurance crisis and claimed 
litigation explosion of the 1980's. The year 1986 is viewed as the 
peak of the insurance crisis, a time when the cost of liability 
insurance skyrocketed and the availability of coverage for some 
products and services disappeared altogether.61 The public in 
general and the insured specifically were told that the crisis was 
caused by a litigation explosion.62 
The flagship case for outrage in the 1980's involved a man who 
was struck by an automobile driven by a drunk driver while standing 
in a phone booth.63 Plaintiff Bigbee sued the telephone company for 
the loss of his leg in this accident because the telephone booth was 
defective and he could not escape due to the defective door. The trial 
court granted a summary judgment in favor of the telephone compa-
ny, which was reversed on appeal. 
This time the outrage about the civil litigation system focused on 
the California Supreme Court finding that Bigbee stated a valid cam~e 
of action against the telephone company. As usual, the media 
distorted the facts, ignoring the defective telephone booth, and arguing 
that it was absurd to hold the telephone company liable when the 
drunk driver was at fault for running into the booth.64 Even the 
President of the United States got into the act, using the Bigbee case 
as an example of what was wrong with civillitigation.65 . Mr. Bigbee 
was so dismayed that the President of the United States distorted the 
61. Insurers had increased premiums drastically for an unusual 
set of products, such as vaccines, general aircraft, and sports 
equipment, and for an equally diverse set of services such as 
obstetrics, ski lifts, and commercial trucking. In still other 
cases--intrauterine devices, wine tasting, and day care, insurers 
had refused to offer coverage at any premium, forcing these 
products and services to be withdrawn from the market. 
Priest, supra note 55, at 1521. 
62. For an article citing numerous sources claiming that the problem was the civil 
litigation system: lawyers, jurors, judges, and the law, see Marc Galanter, The Day After the 
Litigation Exp/osion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3 (1986). 
63. Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 665 P.2d 947 (Cal. 1983). 
64. The Case Against Rose Bird, WALL ST. 1., Oct. 20, 1986, at 26. 
65. Reagan Hits Jury Awards, WASH. POST, May 31,1986, at A9. 
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facts of his case and made light of his tragedy, he testified before a 
congressional committee.66 
A report from the Department of Justice documented the insurance 
crisis and concluded that developments in tort law were the major 
cause of the increased insurance premiums.67 The Justice Depart-
ment report recommended numerous specific reforms in tort law.68 
The most significant recommendations included: a combined cap of 
$100,000 for non-economic and punitive damages; awarding punitive 
damages only where actual malice was proven;69 the elimination of 
joint and several liability; limiting the collateral source rule;70 
scheduling attorney contingency fees; 71 and deference to government 
agency standards. 
Most studies of this report and the data upon which it was based 
found that the litigation statistics did not support the Justice Depart-
ment's claim that there was a litigation explosion.72 Total claim 
66. The Liability Insurance Crisis. Pt. I: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
&onomic Stabilization of the House Committee on Banking. Finance and Urban AfJairs, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 45-47 (1986) (statement of Charles Bigbee). 
67. Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes. Extent and Policy 
Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and AfJordability, Feb. 1986 
(U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1986-491-510:40994) [hereinafter Insurance Report). 
68. For an excellent discussion of the recommendations, see Sanders & Joyce, supra 
note 8, at 207. 
69. With a combined cap of $100,000 for pain and suffering and punitive damages, 
it seems unlikely that a plaintiff would actually recover any punitive damages. Punitive 
damages are not awarded routinely and usually only in cases where the economic damages 
are substantial. When economic damages are substantial, awards for pain and suffering are 
usually commiserate. It should be noted that actual malice is the federal standard in the 1995 
tort reform bill. H.R. REP. No. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(1) (1995) (Ninth Version 
June 26, 1995). 
70. Under the collateral source rule, now abrogated in most jurisdictions, the plaintiff 
could collect damages for loss which the plaintiff had already recovered from a collateral 
source. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.6303 (West 1982) (abrogating the collateral 
source rule in Michigan). See Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape, A.B.A. J., Aug. 
1995, at 59. The only states retaining the collateral source rule are the following: Colorado, 
Florida, Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, and Oregon. Id at 59-60. The 
best example is where the plaintiff's medical expenses are paid by medical insurance 
coverage. 
71. The schedule provided for 25% of the first $100,000,20% of the next $100,000, 
15% of the next $100,000, and 10% for any additional amount. InsuranceReport. supra note 
67, at 72. No recommendation was made concerning defense fees. 
72. See DavidJ. Nye & Donald G. Gifford, The Myth of the Liability Insurance 
Claims Explosion: An Empirical Rebuttal, 41 VAND. L. REv. 909 (1988); Deborah R. 
Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil Justice 's Research, 
48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479 (1987). 
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costs increased dramatically from 1975 to 1986, but not the number 
of claims.73 While there was an increase in federal court caseload, 
a large percentage of the increase included social security and civil 
rights cases.74 Product liability filings did increase rather dramatical-
ly in the federal courts during the nine year period from 1975 to 
1984. However, the increase can be significantly attributed to mass 
latent tort litigation, specifically the asbestos cases.75 
State court filings for tort claims did not document a litigation 
. explosion during the period examined by the Justice Department 
report for federal filings.76 A press release issued in April of 1986 
by the National Center for State Courts stated that there was "no 
evidence to support the existence of a national 'litigation explosion' 
in state trial courts during the 1981-84 time period. "n From 1978 
through 1984, the total tort filings in state courts increased nine 
percent, while the population increased eight percent. 78 Domestic 
relations cases comfrised the greatest single source of any state court 
increase in filings.7 
Nonetheless, apparently following the recommendations of the 
Justice Department report, forty-eight jurisdictions adopted tort reform 
legislation between 1985 and 1988.80 Most jurisdictions placed caps 
on damage awards, altered punitive damage recoveries, changed rules 
involving joint and several liability, and abolished the collateral 
source rule. 81 A majority of states also changed state governmental 
73. Nye & Gifford, supra note 72, at 922. 
74. GaIanter, supra note 62, at 16-19. According to Professor GaIanter, half of the 
total increase over a nine year period involved cases where the federal government sought 
"to recover overpayment of veterans' benefits by litigation and to curtail disability benefits 
by summarily removing beneficiaries from the rolls." Id at 17. 
75. Id at 24. 
76. Hensler, supra note 72, at 479. 
77. John M. Stanoch, Insurance Crisis or Tort Crisis? Exploring Myths and 
Examining Facts, 10 HAMLINE L. REv. 443, 453 (1987). 
78. National Center for State Courts, A Preliminary Examination of Available Civil 
and Criminal Trend Data in State Trial Courts for 1978, 1981 and 1984. Table 34 (Apr. 
1986). 
79. Galanter, supra note 62, at 10. 
80. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 8, at 207 for tables outlining the reforms in each 
jurisdiction. Id. at 220-22. According to this study, only Pennsylvania and Vermont did not 
enact tort reform legislation during the period. Id 
81. 1d Michigan adopted reform with respect to all issues except punitive damages, 
which are not awarded in Michigan. The Michigan substitute for punitive damages is 
exemplary damages. Kewin v. MassachusettsMutual Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 401, 419,295 
N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980). 
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immunity rules, and adopted court rules or statutes providing 
sanctions for the filing of frivolous suits.82 
The 1980's present a multiple choice question: was it a litigation 
crisis, an insurance crisis, all of the above, or none of the above? 
Supporting the proposition that it was an insurance crisis rather than 
a litigation crisis is an examination of insurance cycles. 
When interest rates are high, insurers cut prices and insure bad risks to 
obtain new capital to invest. When interest rates go down, insurers raise 
prices and cancel bad risks. . .. It is this insurance cycle, not the cost 
related to the legal system, that is the primary cause of large insurance 
premium increases.83 
As to the litigation crisis, substantial data indicates that the 
percentage of legitimately injured parties who file claims is low. 84 
"Although the perceived problem is that the system rewards frivolous 
claims, the reality [may very well be] that a large number of valid 
claims go uncompensated. ,,8S In the medical malpractice arena, for 
example, only one in ten injuries resulting from negligence is 
litigated. 86 
Furthermore, if it was in fact a litigation crisis which caused the 
insurance crisis and motivated tort reform throughout the country, 
would tort reform stabilize or lower insurance rates? In an Insurance 
Service Office study, over 1200 insurance claims adjusters analyzed 
the impact of the proposed tort law changes on insurance rates. 87 
The study found that changes made in 1986 by fifteen states would 
not affect insurance rates. 
82. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 8, at 220-22. Michigan followed the majority with 
respect to these reforms. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1401-1415 (West 1986) (1986 
amendments to the governmental immunity statute). See the following court rules providing 
for sanctions when filing a frivolous suit: IND. Cr. R. 11; Ky. Cr. R. 11; MICH. Cr. R. 
2.114; OHIO Cr. R. 11; and TENN. Cr. R. 11.01. 
83. Stanoch, supra note 77, at 444-45. 
84. Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443 
(1987). 
85. Sales, supra note 13, at 69. 
86. Deborah R. Hensler, et. aI, Compensation/or Accidental Injuries in the United 
States, 30-31 (1991) (citing The Report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study to the State 
of New York (1990». 
87. Insurers Fear Re/orm Foes to Capitalize on ISO Study, J. COM., May 18, 1987, 
at 2. 
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Ironically, an article in the New York Times in April of 1986, 
predicted that the insurance industry's profit cycle would start 
declining in a year or two toward a 1995 insurance crisis.88 
C. Common Sense Tort Reform of 1995 
One part of the "Contract with America" unveiled in September 
of 1994 by Georgia Representative Newt Gingrich was "Common 
Sense Legal Reform.,,89 In March of 1995, the House passed several 
bills which reflect recommendations made by the Justice Department 
report of 1986 and which in some cases preempt the states control 
over civil litigation. This Section will review the significant 
provisions of those bills to see whether the reforms solve the 
"litigation crisis." This is done, however, with one important caveat: 
the reform may have died before birth. According to the Washington 
Times in July, Speaker Gingrich stated that product liability tort 
reform is dead, at least for now.90 
Well, just in case it is not dead, what was reformed? Both the 
House91 and the Senate92 have acted with respect to product liabili-
ty law. Significantly, Congress preempted the field of strict product 
liability and adopted the lesser standard of negligence against the 
product's seller. In order to recover for injuries caused by a defective 
product, a plaintiff must prove that a retailer was negligent (lacked 
reasonableness).93 This provision eliminates a 402A strict product 
liability cause of action against a product's seller unless the manufac-
turer is not subject to service of process or is judgment proof. Unless 
there are long arm jurisdiction problems, the seller will not usmilly be 
sued in products liability cases.94 
88. Reform Insurance, Not Liability Law; Taming the Latest Insurance Crisis, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 13, 1986. 
89. The "Contract with America" was part of the campaign strategy of Republican 
candidates throughout the country during the 1994 election. 
90. WASH. TIMES, National Weekly Edition, July 17-23, 1995, p. 3. col. 3. 
91. H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
92. S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
93. H.R. 956 § 104(a); S. 565 § 5(a). 
94. Undoubtedly, manufacturers had hoped to escape strict product liability with 
preemption of the field and a federal statute that permitted the cause of action based upon 
negligence instead. The total elimination of the 402A strict product liability cause of action 
would provide significant proof problems for many plaintiffs injured by defective products. 
Even though there was a high correlation between manufacturing negligence and manufactur-
ing defects, proving the specific negligent conduct was frequently an obstacle for the plaintiff. 
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Two other provisions of the passed House and Senate bills are 
significant with respect to product liability litigation. First, is an 
elimination of joint and several liability. The elimination of joint and 
several liability was recommended by the Justice Department in 1986. 
An overwhelming majority of states modified or abolished the rule as 
part of the 1980's tort reform movement.9S Accordingly, the 
purpose here is uniformity among the jurisdictions. Second, and 
potentially more significant, the provision caps punitive damages at 
$250,000, or two (Senate Bill) or three (House Bill) times the 
compensatory damages, whichever is larger. 
Punitive damages have been attacked on a number of grounds. 
First, punitive damages are inconsistent with the idea that damages 
compensate the plaintiff for harm suffered as a result of a defendant's 
actions. Second, punitive damages are intended to punish the 
defendant, having no correlation to the harm suffered. Third, the 
range of potential liability with punitive damages is enormous. 
In product liability cases, punitive damage awards are intended to 
deter the manufacturer from acting with reckless indifference to 
safety. They relate to corrective justice through deterrence of 
conduct. Liability for punitive damages affects corporate behavior by 
cost minimalization and safety decisions.96 Corporations involved 
in a continuing problem-solving process are more likely to be deterred 
from future conduct than individuals.97 Who can forget the outcry 
when the jury awarded $125 million dollars in punitive damages 
against Ford Motor Company in the exploding Pinto gas tank case.98 
Although the amount was reduced on appeal to $3.5 million, the jury 
had made its point. Based upon community values, the jurors were 
outraged that the manufacturer knew of the danger and intentionally 
failed to warn the consumer-user. 
Section 402A was based for the most part on a theory of assumed negligence, rather than an 
a theory of enterprise liability. Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning of the Possible End of the 
Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REv. 601, 624 (1992). 
95. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 8, at 221-22 (indicating that limits on joint and 
several liability appeared in nearly every tort refonn act). 
96. Sugarman, supra note 7, at 574-75. 
97. "[T]ort liability creates more effective deterrent incentives for problem-solving 
actors than would exist in the absence of liability." Howard A. Latin, Problem Solving 
Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REv. 677, 740 (1985). 
98. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). The $127 
million dollar verdict was reduced to $6.7 mi11ion on appeal. Grimshaw, 174 'Cal. Rptr. at 
349. The $125 million in punitive damages was reduced to $3.5 million. ld 
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But as a matter of fact punitive damages are not awarded routinely in 
product liability cases, but only where there are circumstances of aggrava-
tion. These include reckless indifference to safety, gross negligence, and 
concealment by the manufacturer of the dangerousness of his product from 
consumers. The last is a form of fraud, which is an intentional tort, and 
the economic case for punitive damages is the same as in other intentional 
tort cases.99 
While gross negligence may be a borderline case, economists strongly 
favor punitive damages in intentional tort cases. Even Professor 
Priest who wants to eliminate third-party insurance from tort liability, 
favors punitive damage awards based on fraudulent behavior where 
manufacturers deliberately misrepresent product safety.IOO 
Inconsistent with the conception of runaway jury verdicts, the 
liberal states of New York and California do not produce an abun-
dance of punitive damage awards in product liability cases. In a 
survey of twenty New York and California product liability cases, 
plaintiffs won fifty percent of the cases, however no punitive damages 
were awarded. 101 Furthermore, as indicated previously, punitive 
damage awards are frequently SUbjected to remittitur. 
The question remains then whether these caps are an appropriate 
tort reform measure, or if the caps will negatively impact deterrence 
of deliberate misrepresentation of product safety. The outgoing 
president of the International Association of Defense Counsel 
contends that caps on punitive damages are "one of the most 
important changes" in tort reform,102 since different plaintiffs may 
be awarded punitive damages for the same conduct. 
99. WILLIAM A. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 302 (1987) (emphasis added). 
100. Priest, supra note 55, at 1589. 
101. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 99, at 305. In a sample of 359 cases, punitive 
damages were allowed in only seven, or two percent of the cases. [d. These results were 
consistent with a study of all civil jury trials in San Francisco and in Cook County, Illinois 
between 1960 and 1984, conducted by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice. 
In this entire period there were only eight awards of punitive damages in products 
liability cases. In percentage terms, only eight-tenths of 1 percent of all jury trials 
in San Francisco in products liability cases resulted in such an award; the 
corresponding figure for Cook County was only one-tenth of 1 percent. 
[d. at 306-07. Furthermore, these figures may overstate the plaintiffs' success, because the 
figures do not report whether the jury awards were reduced by the trial judge or on appeal. 
102. San Francisco lawyer Kevin Dunne stated, "In my view, [punitive damages] really 
were a threat to the civil justice system and had a huge effect on the American economy." 
Middleton, supra note 70, at 61. 
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Undoubtedly, the preemptive nature of the federal bills is to avoid 
a subsequent ruling by the courts that setting federal standards for 
state civil procedures violates Congress' power under the Commerce 
Clause. 103 Nevertheless, this type of federal legislation may still be 
challenged under the Tenth Amendment as a violation of state 
sovereignty. 104 
The House tort reform bills passed in March of 1995 are more 
extensive and affect litigation outside the products liability arena. 
First, the previously mentioned cap on punitive damages applies to all 
civil cases in the state and federal courts. The House bill will 
effectively eliminate defamation claims by the stars against tabloids 
sold at grocery store checkout counters. lOS The House bill also 
eliminates joint and several liability in all civil cases in state and 
federal COurtS. I06 It is unclear how this provision will effect vicari-
ous liability created by statute or common law and whether several 
liability will eliminate indemnification in this context. 
This same House bill also preempts state tort law concerning non-
economic damages in most medical malpractice cases. The bill 
imposes a non-economic damage cap of $250,000 and preempts state 
law. 107 Many states, including Michigan, have already placed caps 
on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases. 108 Indiana 
has a cap on economic damages as well. 109 The Indiana statute 
provides for a state fund, similar to an uninsured motorist fund for 
103. "By enforcing limits on the commerce power, the Court effectively warned 
Congress to move carefully when federalizing criminal law or setting federal standards for 
civil procedure, such as punitive damages and fee-shifting." David O. Stewart, Back to the 
Commerce Clause, A.B.A. 1., July 1995, at 46. This article discusses the somewhat 
surprising ruling of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 
1624 (1995). 
104. Middleton, supra note 70, at 56, 60. 
105. See Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(awarding Carol Burnett $50,000 in compensatory damages and $750,000 in punitive 
damages). 
106. "In a product liability action that is subject to this title, the liability of each 
defendant for noneconomic loss shall be several only and shall not be joint." H.R. 956 § 
1l0(a). 
107. "This Act supersedes a state law only to the extent that state law applies to an 
issue covered under this title." Id. at § I 02(B)( I). 
108. Michigan's cap on non-economic damages is $225,000 plus an annual adjustment 
in accordance with the consumer price index. MICH. Ct>MP. LAWS ANN. § 600. 1483( I) (West 
1988). 
109. See IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-14-3 (Burns 1994). After January I, 1990, the total 
amount recoverable for an injury or death may not exceed $750,000. Id. 
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automobile negligence cases, to pay the economic loss above the 
statutory limit. I 10 
Caps on non-economic damages are far more troublesome than the 
caps on punitive damages. Contingency fees are traditionally paid out 
of non-economic damages. Additionally, litigation expenses are paid 
by this source. In complicated medical malpractice cases, litigation 
expenses can be immense. Accordingly, caps on non-economic 
damages effectively eliminate some malpractice claims, undoubtedly 
the result sought by lobbying forces. 
When examining tort reform, caps on non-economic damages in 
medical malpractice actions are most unfair because of the nature of 
the claim. Risks in medical malpractice cases are non-reciprocal; III 
the risk of harm runs only to the patient and not to the health care 
provider. A recent Florida case provides illustration. In the clearest 
case of negligence, the healthy kidney was removed from the patient 
during surgery rather than the cancerous kidney. There was no risk 
of harm to the tortfeasors, while the innocent plaintiff had a loss of 
the quality of life and a capped recovery for pain and suffering. At 
least the litigation costs will be minimal because an expert witness 
will not be required to establish the obvious breach of the standard of 
care. In most medical malpractice cases, however, the burden of 
proof is significant. The plaintiff has to use expert witnesses to 
establish the breach of the standard of care, and determine that the 
breach was a proximate cause of the resulting harm. I 12 With 
tougher standards for expert witness qualification, where the plaintiff 
is successful, the defendant has in fact been negligent. 
Finally, caps in medical malpractice cases significantly affect the 
seriously injured and the young. 113 A striking example of the lack 
of fairness is the case of Steven Olsen, a blind and severely handi-
capped child. I 14 A California jury awarded Steven $4.2 million for 
medical bills and future wages, and $7 million for non-economic loss. 
The trial judge reduced the $7 million to $250,000, the statutory cap 
for non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases in California. 
110. See IND. CODE ANN. § 27-12-15-1 (Burns 1994). 
lIt. George Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Law, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 
(1972). 
112 .. See MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 600.2169 (West Supp. 1994-95). This statute 
places numerous restrictions on the qualifications of an expert witness in a medical 
malpractice case. Id. 
113. Rabin, supra note 9, at 40. 
114. Hope Viner Samborn, Plaintiffs Often Pay a Pricefor Reform, A.B.A. 1., Aug. 
1995, at 68. 
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Steven is a catastrophically injured plaintiff. The non-economic 
award represents pain and suffering and the loss of quality of life. 
Assuming that the attorney in Steven's case acted pro bono, Steven 
received approximately $4,000 a year for the loss of quality of his 
life, assuming he lives to be sixty. The problem with medical 
malpractice caps is that individuals suffer loss so that society can 
control medical costs and encourage physicians to stay in business. 
Caps in medical malpractice cases punish those who suffer the 
most. In catastrophic cases there is objective proof of pain and 
suffering and of a loss in quality of life. From a fairness standpoint, 
juries in these cases should be permitted to award damages without 
limitation. Limiting or eliminating non-economic damages in less 
serious cases and uncapping recoveries for devastating injury is a 
more just approach to tort reform. The Michigan automobile no-fault 
threshold for non-economic recovery is illustrative. lIS Unfortunate-
ly, this would not reduce the frequency and the size of the judgments. 
Finally, it should be noted that caps on non-economic damages are 
unfair because they affect the poor and economically disadvantaged 
most severely. As sad as severe injury is, if the injured plaintiff has 
an annual income in excess of $300,000 a year, the economic 
damages will insure as much comfort as is possible under a reduced 
quality of life. This is not true if the plaintiff is a minimum wage 
earner, or a child who will not be able to establish future potential 
earning capacity as a corporation president. 
As part of the tort reform package, the House also passed a bill 
modifying the American rule that attorney fees are paid by the 
individual client. 116 In order to limit frivolous litigation, the bill 
adopts a modified version of the English rule, that the losing party 
pays the attorney fees. This provision of the bill applies only in 
federal court diversity cases. It is a modified version because the 
plaintiff may still have to pay the defendant's attorney fees if she 
prevails at trial and establishes that the defendant wrongfully harmed 
the plaintiff. Parties are permitted to make settlement offers until ten 
days before trial. A party who rejects a settlement offer will be liable 
115. Michigan's no fault statute bars the plaintiff from recovering any non-economic 
losses unless the plaintiff demonstrates an injury enumerated in the statute. A motor vehicle 
accident plaintiff has met the statutory threshold if the plaintiff has suffered: (I) death, (2) 
permanent, serious disfigurement, or (3) the serious impairment of a bodily function. MICH. 
COMPo LAWS ANN. § 500.3135 (West 1988). 
116. H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
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for the opponent's attorney fees if the settlement offered exceeds the 
judgment awarded to the rejecting party.117 
The perceived problem with the English rule is that only the rich 
can afford the risks of litigation. I IS While there is merit in discour-
aging "long-shot" cases, this rule could "discourage meritorious suits 
by people who fear the cost of losing.,,119 "If the English rule had 
been in effect here, none of the civil rights cases would have been 
brought. If they had lost, a single lawsuit would have wiped out their 
treasuries. ,,120 
The modified English rule of the House bill may be worse than 
the actual rule. The idea that a plaintiff, who has proven liability on 
the part of the defendant, would have to pay the defendant's attorney 
fees when the jury award was a few dollars less than the defendant's 
fmal settlement offer is a very one-sided rule. Additionally, it. is 
unclear whether the costs of litigation are also covered by this rule. 
As stated earlier, it is possible that none of these changes will in 
fact become law. Nevertheless, the need for these changes should be 
questioned. Since the 1970's, state legislatures have been reforming 
tort law. During the 1980's, forty-eight of the fifty states enacted tort 
reform legislation covering recommendations of the Justice Depart-
ment Report. 121 Currently, many jurisdictions continue to refine tort 
law. 122 For example, Illinois recently adopted a major tort reform 
117. If all offers made by a party . . . with respect to a claim or 
Id. at § 2. 
claims, including any motion to dismiss all claims, are not 
accepted and the judgment, verdict, or order finally issued 
(exclusive of costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees incurred after 
judgment or trial) in the action under this section is not more 
favorable to the offeree with respect to the claim or claims than 
the last such offer, the offeror may file with the court, within 
10 days after the final judgment, verdict, or order is issued, a 
petition for payment of costs and expenses, including attorneys' 
fees, incurred with respect to the claim or claims from the date 
the last such offer was made or, if the offeree made an offer 
under this subsection, from the date the last such offer by the 
offeree was made. 
118. See Tilting the Scales: Contracts Legal Reforms Would Protect Rich and 
Wrongdoers, DET. FREE PREss, Feb. 6, 1995, at A7. 
119. NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 20, 1995, at 6. 
120. Putting People in Their Place, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1995, at A2. 
121. See Sanders & Joyce, supra note 8, at 207. 
122. "During their current sessions, state legislatures have taken up more than 70 new 
tort law bills, according to the American Tort Reform Association. . .. Among states with 
new tort rules are Illinois, Indiana, Montana, North Dakota, Texas and Wisconsin." 
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act. 123 Michigan followed suit substantially changing Michigan tort 
law in two major" pieces of legislation. 124 The question is how 
much refonn do we need, and is the current legislation headed in the 
right direction? 
These refonns are focused almost exclusively on limiting the size 
and source of damages or remedies available to plaintiffs. A basic 
concern seems to be that the tort system ultimately imposes the costs 
on the consumer by making defendants pay large awards. However, 
when individuals are injured, costs are nonnally transferred to others 
in some way. Assuming that tort refonn discourages litigation, who 
will take care of the injured party? If the injured party has medical 
insurance, the medical expenses caused by the defendant will be 
passed on to the consumer public as increased health care premiums. 
Proposed tort refonn will transfer the costs of plaintiffs' injuries from 
the responsible defendants to the consumer public at large. 
Furthennore, most Americans do not have disability insurance 
unless they are disabled in the workplace. Thus, while more affluent 
Americans who are injured may have long tenn health care and 
disability insurance, most Americans do not. Therefore, cost-
spreading to the consumer will continue because if the costs are not 
shifted to the defendant's consumers, then the costs will be shifted to 
the government and taxpayers. Economists "generally agree that it is 
better to do cost-spreading within the marketplace where deterrence 
and safety and design improvements will be encouraged. 
Before altering the law to save defendants money, we need to ascertain if 
changes in real terms have occurred, 125 and if so what has 
caused them. . .. Even if an increase in average awards reflects nothing 
more than jurors placing a higher value on life and health than they once 
did, or on intangible hurts, we need to think hard about whether this is 
undesirable. 126 " 
Middleton, supra note 70, at 56-57. 
123. 1995 Ill. Legis. Servo 89-7 (West) (also known as the Civil Justice Reform 
Amendments of 1995). For a comprehensive discussion of the statute see J. Jeffrey 
Zimmerman et aI., A Review of the Illinois CiviIJusticeReform Act of 1995,83 ILL. B.J. 282 
(June 1995). The act is similar to the federal bills in that it caps punitive damages at three 
times the economic award, eliminates joint and several liability, and limits recovery for non-
economic damages in personal injury actions to $500,000 or less. 
124. 1995 Mich. Pub. Acts 222; 1995 Mich. Pub. Acts 249. 
125. This refers to whether or not their juries have gone wild. 
126. Saks, supra note 13, at 74. 
HeinOnline -- 1995 Det. C.L. Rev. 1232 1995
1232 Law Review [4:1207 
Reforms are aimed primarily at improving the economy by 
creating a favorable business climate and reducing insurance 
costs. 127 While these purposes are laudable, it must be understood 
that we are sacrificing individual rights of injured persons to benefit 
society as a whole. These purposes are inconsistent with corrective 
justice which seeks to correct wrongs and accomplish justice between 
parties. 
Do we want a tort system that values business and jobs over an 
individual's health and welfare? Do we want a system that protects 
Dow Corning and its employees at the expense of the class action 
litigants who suffered injury because of silicone breast implants? 
Based on letters to the editor received by the Detroit News during 
July, 1995,128 the answer depends on personal perspective. Employ-
ees of Dow Corning want to protect their jobs, breast implant victims 
want to be compensated for the harm.129 
Generally, the public appears willing to accept a policy to improve 
the economy and lessen the recovery of the individually harmed 
plaintiff. This acceptance may be blamed on the public lack of trust 
in juries, judges or lawyers. The public attitude about jury behavior 
is a key factor in fueling tort reform.130 Unfortunately, the attitude 
is based in part on media distortion.131 The media reports the most 
bizarre facts out of context, convincing the public something is wrong 
with the tort system. "A feature of much reporting is that it fails to 
127. These were the stated purposes of the recent Illinois legislation. See supra note 
123. 
128. Letters to the Editor, DET. NEWS, July 30, 1995, at A12. 
129. The following is a quote from an emotional letter to the editor from a victim of 
the implant tragedy: 
From my perspective as a victim ... [y]ou demonstrated briIIiantly that what is 
wrong with America today has to do with a society that values corporations over 
individuals and money over morality; that supports fat cats who lie about research 
to market defective products and line their pockets with the tears and fears of 
unsuspecting customers; that turns the tables on those customers, many of whom 
have already had enough heartache; and whose newspapers pick and choose the 
medical studies they report about to sway public opinion in favor of the poor, 
downtrodden multibiIIionaire company. In my house, the question[s] is not, "Dad 
are you gonna lose your job?" 
Dad, will Mom die from this? DET. NEWS, July 30, 1995, at A12 (editorial letter from 
Marjorie Immekus). 
130. Sanders & Joyce, supra note 8, at 248. • 
131. Richard W. Power, An Essay on Tort Litigation and the Media, 40 OKLA. L. 
REv. 35 (1987). 
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identify the basis for imposing liability.,,132 Thus the public is led 
to believe that anytime someone is injured they can collect money 
from a deep pocket. 
The idea that one can collect for any injury is reinforced by 
attorney advertising. The voice from the television asks, "Have you 
slipped, fallen, been injured in an automobile accident or at work? 
If so, call 1-800-attorney.,,133 The plethora of these ads convinces 
the public that everyone is suing. Special interest groups then use 
these ads to support their argument that the litigation explosion is 
causing all of the country's economic problems. The groups argue 
that attorneys are making all the money, and Joe Public is paying the 
pnce. 
To reverse support for tort refonn, attitudes must change. First, 
the public must understand the devastating affect this legislation has 
on individuals. The best way to comprehend the impact is for the 
public to put itself in an injured person's position. Imagine yourself 
as a young, previously healthy adult who has been rendered a 
paraplegic by the wrong-doing of a drunk driver. What dollar amount 
fairly represents your pain, suffering and loss of enjoyment of 
life?134 Should you, the injured individual, and other innocent 
plaintiffs similarly situated be forced to assume the burden of 
maintaining lower insurance rates? Placing ourselves in the plaintiff's 
shoes pennits us to perceive the burden damage caps place on the 
individual. Public awareness could also change public reaction to 
several liability and the modified English rule for attorney fees. 
Second, the public needs to be educated on the value of the jury 
process. The jury uses community values to detennine the financial 
responsibility of the defendant for the plaintiff's injuries. The jury 
reaches a consensus judgment based upon its understanding of the 
case that is pieced together from the testimony of the witnesses and 
the parties. The judge instructs the jury on the rules of law which 
provide the framework and a shared vocabulary for jury delibera-
tion. I35 Competence of the jury is the function of two attributes: 
132. Id. at 36. 
133. Although this sounds like a real ad, it is just an illustration. 
134. When involved in this exercise in class, torts students universally arrive at large 
dollar amounts, minimally several million dollars. The exercise undoubtedly illustrates why 
the golden rule argument is generally inadmissible since it urges the jurors to substitute 
themselves for the plaintiff in determining the dollar value to place on pain and suffering. 
135. Wells, supra note 10, at 2406. 
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its number and its interaction. 136 The jury process works well at 
bringing out the facts and narrowing down the important issues. \31 
Not every coffee spill results in liability on the part of the seller 
for the resulting harm. Only under some facts will fairness and an 
examination of fault require that the seller be held fmancially 
responsible for the plaintiff s injuries. The judge in the Liebeck case 
told the jury that McDonald's was required to use ordinary care in 
serving coffee. Based upon community standards, the jury decided 
what ordinary care was under the circumstances, and reached a 
consensus judgment. The jury consensus judgment was based upon 
community values to fairly right the wrong inflicted on the plaintiff 
by the defendant. Educating the public on the jury process will 
improve its public image. Bolstering the public image of the jury will 
improve the country's perception of the entire litigation system. 
Third, attorneys must also improve their public image. The public 
needs to understand the purpose for contingency fees. Contingency 
fees permit attorneys to take cases that middle class injured persons 
would not otherwise be able to bring. Plaintiffs' attorneys advance 
thousands of dollars in costs for experts, accident reconstruction, and 
investigation attempting to prove a case. They are not always 
successful. 138 Plaintiff attorneys who work on contingency provide 
a valuable service to the public. 
136. A jury decision, however, is more than an average of the 
verdict preferences of six or twelve citizens who represent a 
variety of experiences. Ideally, the knowledge, perspectives, 
and memories of the individual members are compared and 
combined, and individual errors and biases are discovered and 
discarded, so that the final verdict is forged from a shared 
understanding of the case. This understanding is more com-
plete and more accurate than any of the separate versions that 
contributed to it, or indeed than their average. This transcen-
dent understanding is the putative benefit of the deliberation 
process. 
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are 12 Heads Better Than 1? U. MICH. L. SCHOOL L. QUADRANGLE 
NOTES, July 1995, at 56. 
137. Id. at 64. 
138. A case in point: recently a plaintiff's attorney advanced over $70,000 in costs 
attempting to prove a plaintiff's closed head injury from a vehicular accident. The jury found 
no cause of action, apparently believing the defense argument that the plaintiff was faking. 
Sliwinski v. Goodman, No. 94-403420 (3d Cir. Mich. 1994). Changing the way attorney fees 
are paid may not alter business law practice but it will definitely impact negatively on a 
plaintiff's ability to go to trial. 
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Finally, another way to help strengthen the image is to work on 
tort reform that makes sense to the public. Our law should reflect 
basic moral values that we share as members of the human race 
without regard to religion or national origin. When the law lags too 
far behind widely held notions of justice, the community will lose its 
respect for and confidence in the law. 139 Accordingly, tort reform 
efforts should address the concerns of the public and recommenda-
tions of the commentators regarding improvements in the quality of 
law. The common law should reflect the universal moral principles 
of our society. 
It is difficult to defend a legal system which contains rules that 
are revolting to any moral sense. 140 An excellent example of such 
a law is the "no duty to aid" rule. Assume that a blind person is 
about to step into the street in front of an automobile. According to 
the rule, one witnessing the blind person's prospective demise is 
under no duty to warn or prevent the accident even though it could 
be done without peril or delay to one's own progress. 141 Corre-
spondingly, there is no legal obligation to render assistance to the 
victim of crime. 
The public has frequently responded with horror and shock when 
a person is brutalized while bystanders observe without rendering aid. 
The absence of a rule of law requiring simple rescue or assistance to 
crime victims shocks the conscience. When teaching torts, predictably 
the one rule which astonishes students is that there is no duty to aid 
a victim. 142 
The need for morality based tort reform appears clear. Tort 
reform which makes sense to the public can only improve the public's 
139. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis o/Tort Liability, 
56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 337 (1908). 
140. This is how Dean Prosser described the common law rule of "no duty to aid." 
KEETON, supra note 25, § 56 at 375. 
ld. 
141. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314, iIIus. 1 (1965) provides: 
A sees B, a blind man, about to step into the street in front of an approaching 
automobile. A could prevent B from so doing by a word or touch without delaying 
his own progress. A does not do so, and B is run over and hurt. A is under no 
duty to prevent B from stepping into the street and is not liable to B. 
142. Professor Leslie Bender commented similarly in her article. Bender, supra note 
12, at 3. Professor Bender points out that while the students originally find the "no duty" 
rule to be reprehensible, they become immersed in the reasoned analysis. "They are taught 
to reject their emotions, instincts, and ethics, and to view accidents and tragedies abstractly." 
Id. 
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perception of the legal profession. Tort reform should be based on 
morality with positive conduct goals, rather than aimed at reducing 
the frequency and size of judgments. Therefore, although only one 
major common law rule is addressed here, a movement toward 
morality-based, rather than economic-based tort reform, could foster 
a new found respect for the law. 
II. THE ''No DUTY To AID" RULE 
During the same thirty year period that Congress and state 
legislatures have been reforming modem tort law, commentators have 
consistently recommended altering the "no duty to aid" rule. 143 The' 
first rash of articles began in 1964, immediately after the Kitty 
Genovese murder. l44 Thirty-eight of Ms. Genovese's neighbors 
watched for over thirty minutes while she was stabbed to death. No 
one called the police despite her repeated calls for help. A reexami-
nation of the "no duty to aid" rule emerged in reaction to the 
Genovese facts. The University of Chicago Law School sponsored a 
conference to discuss the significant legal questions posed. 145 The 
problems that the Kitty Genovese case presented were not ·easily 
resolved. 
Is a citizen required, and should he be required, to lend assistance to 
another who is in danger of severe personal injury or substantial loss of 
property? Should it make any difference if the potential loss stems from 
the commission of a crime, or from accident, Act of God or other causes? 
Must the passer-by intervene only when he can do so at no peril to 
himself? Only when the peril to himself is less than the harm which the 
victim will suffer?146 
Despite thirty years of comment, the law in the overwhelming 
majority of states remains the same. One who sees a stranger in peril 
has no duty to render aid, even if that aid is merely a phone call to 
the police. Only a few states have enacted a statutory "duty to aid," 
with several others enacting legislation creating a duty to notify the 
authorities. 
143. Technically, two major articles shortly after the turn of the century began the 
debate. See Bohlen, supra note 139, at 217; James B. Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. 
REv. 97 (1908). 
144. Gansberg, supra note 15, at AI. 
145. See supra note 16. 
146. THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND TIlE LAW at x (Introduction). 
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During this thirty year period only one case can be read as 
adopting a "duty to aid" rule, despite the court's apparent holding to 
the contrary. In Soldano v. O'Daniels,141 the defendant owned and 
operated a restaurant, open to the public. The defendant's employee 
refused to call the police or permit a patron from the bar across the 
street to call the police, even though the plaintiff s father had been 
threatened and was subsequently shot and killed. The defense 
maintained that this was a case of nonfeasance, and that the law did 
not require the giving of aid to another in peril, even when the aid 
was only the use of the telephone. 
The California court acknowledged that there was no special 
relationship between the defendant and the deceased. The court then 
looked at enumerated factors148 to be considered in determining 
whether a duty is owed to a third person, and decided that a duty was 
owed under the facts presented. "We conclude that the bartender 
owed a duty to the plaintiff s decedent to permit the patron from 
Happy Jack's to place a call to the police or to place the call 
himself.,,149 
After creating a duty to aid the good Samaritan, the court 
recanted, emphasizing that it was not creating a duty to go to the aid 
of another. The court found that its decision was a logical extension 
of Restatement § 327150 which imposes liability for negligently 
147. 190 Cal. Rptr. 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
148. These factors were enunciated by the California Supreme Court in Rowland v. 
Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968). The factors giving rise to a duty of care were stated 
as: 
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff 
suffered injury, the closeness ofthe connection between the defendant's conduct 
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the 
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and 
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the 
risk involved. 
Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564. In Rowland, the court abolished the distinction between 
trespasser, licensee and invitee for purposes of landowner-occupier liability. This "multi-
factor duty approach" is recommended by at least one commentator as an appropriate 
alternative to the per se rule of no duty to aid in good Samaritan cases. David P. Leonard, 
The Good Samaritan Rule as a Procedural Control Device: Is It Worth Saving? 19 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REv. 807 (1986). 
149. Soldano, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 310. 
150. One who knows or has reason to know that a third person is 
giving or is ready to give to another aid necessary to prevent 
physical harm to him, and negligently prevents or disables the 
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interfering with a rescue. Soldano could have created a common law 
rule of duty to aid one in peril, where there was no risk of harm to 
the aider. Instead, the case was limited to the facts presented. 
Despite the debate and an outcry from the public, legislatures also 
have been reluctant to act. Only a small minority of jurisdictions 
have enacted legislation. The first type of legislation, adopted in 
three states, requires aid be given to one in Eeril, if that aid can be 
given without danger or peril to the rescuer. 51 The second type of 
third person from giving such aid, is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to the other by the absence of the aid 
which he has prevented the third person from giving. 
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 327 (1965). 
151. Vermont, Minnesota, and Rhode Island statutes provide that aid must be given 
in emergency situations. The first state to adopt a statute was Vermont. The statute 
provides: 
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to 
the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to himself or 
without interference with important duties owed to others, give reasonable 
assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being provided by 
others. 
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with subsection (a) 
of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts constitute gross 
negligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive remuneration. Nothing 
contained in this subsection shall alter existing law with respect to tort liability of a 
practitioner of the healing arts for acts committed in the ordinary course of his 
practice. 
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be fined not 
more than $100.00. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973 & Supp. 1994). 
The Rhode Island statute states: 
Any person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is 
exposed to, or has suffered, grave physical harm shall, to the extent that he or she 
can do so without danger or peril to himself or herself or to others, give reasonable 
assistance to the exposed person. Any person violating the provisions of this 
section shall be guilty ofa petty misdemeanor and shall be subject to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding six (6) months or by a fine of not more than five hundred 
dollars ($500), or both. 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-56-1 (1994). 
The key subsection from the Minnesota statutes provides: 
A person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another person is exposed 
to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do 
so without danger or peril to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the 
exposed person. Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to 
obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. A person who violates this 
subdivision is guilty of a petty misdemeanor. 
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legislation imposes criminal sanctions for failure to report a 
crime. 152 The crimes that must be reported vary from jurisdic-
tion. IS3 Wisconsin has a hybrid version which creates a duty to 
report a specified crime or aid a victim of a crime. IS4 Accordingly, 
even jurisdictions that provide a duty to aid frequently limit the duty 
to victims of crime. 
Several rationales have been enunciated for the apparent reluctance 
to modify the "no duty to aid" rule. First, creating such a duty would 
interfere with individual liberty. ISS Secondly, it has been suggested 
that creating a duty would be costly, and that the added costs would 
reduce the number of potential rescuers. Therefore, ''the strong 
swimmer would avoid the crowded beach. ,,156 Furthermore, it is 
claimed that administrative costs would be high because of the large 
number of potential tortfeasors and the difficulty of allocating 
fault. 157 
These reasons provide inadequate justification for failing to adopt 
a "duty to aid" rule. Before intervening and rendering assistance, a 
bystander must observe the incident, interpret it to be an emergency, 
and feel personally responsible. Research documents that the more 
people present at an emergency the less likely anyone will act, due to 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01.l (WestSupp. 1992) (emphasis added). The Minnesota statute 
differs by expressly referring to the possibility of obtaining aid from law enforcement 
personnel. This is similar to the reporting statutes. See infra note 152. 
152. At least six states contain these types of provisions: Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. 
§ 18-8-115 (1986), Florida. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027 (West 1992), Massachusetts,MAss. 
GEN. LAW ANN. ch. 268 § 40 (West 1990), Ohio, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2921.21 
(Anderson 1993), Rhode Island, RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-3.1 (1994), and Washington, WASH. 
REv. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (West 1988). 
153. The Colorado statute is very general and requires the reporting of any crime. 
COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-8-115. Florida and Rhode Island have specific reporting statutes for 
sexual battery offenses. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.027; RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-3.1. 
154. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West Supp. 1994). 
155. Libertarian writers argue that the purpose of law is to protect individual rights, 
and so long as one does not interfere with the rights of others, one should be free to act. 
Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 21. LEGAL Sruo. 151 (1973). 
156. This argument is advanced by Richard A. Posner. RICHARD A. POSNER, 
EcONOMIC ANAYLSIS OF LAW 174 (3d ed. 1986). The author subsequently appears to have 
modified this economic analysis: "Although the preceding analysis does not prove that the 
common law's refusal to impose liability for failure to rescue is efficient, it prevents one 
from concluding that the absence of such a rule necessarily is inefficient." LANDES & 
POSNER, supra note 99, at 146. 
157. It is claimed the cost of enforcement of a duty to aid would be extremely high, 
"higher than for any other activity governed by either common or criminal law." Paul H. 
Rubin, Costs and Benefits of a Duty to Rescue, 6 INT'L REv. L..& EcON. 273 (1986). 
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the inertia of the group. ISS However, research also demonstrates 
that when individuals know they have a legal duty, they are more 
likely to act positively.ls9 Creating a legal duty to aid should 
encourage action, since all or most present should be aware of their 
legal obligation. One reason why individuals in a group fail to act to 
rescue is because they are uncertain as to how others will react to 
their rescue. Treated as a societal norm, a legal duty to aid would 
encourage rescue by setting the standard for appropriate behavior. l60 
There exists a symbiotic relationship between legal and moral rules, 
accordingly, creating a legal duty to rescue would increase the number 
of people who felt morally obligated to do SO.161 
Fulfillment of the legal duty can be as simple as seeking profes-
sional help by calling the police or emergency medical assistance. 
Additionally, professional rescuers are frequently overburdened. 
158. We have suggested four different reasons why people, once 
having noticed an emergency, are less likely to go to the aid of 
the victim when others are present: (I) Others serve as an 
audience to one's actions, inhibiting him from doing foolish 
things. (2) Others serve as guides to behavior, and if they are 
inactive, they will lead the observer to be inactive also. (3) 
The interactive effect ofthese two process will be much greater 
than either alone; if each bystander sees other bystanders 
momentarily frozen by audience inhibition, each may be misled 
into thinking the situation must not be serious. (4) The 
presence of other people dilutes the responsibility felt by any 
single bystander, making him feel that it is less necessary for 
himself to act. 
BIBB LATANE & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSNE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESN'T HE 
HELP? 125 (1970). 
159. A study of students from different countries illustrated that when students knew 
that there was a legal duty to aid, they reacted more positively to the duty to aid and judged 
an ablebodied person's failure to aid more harshly. "Breaking the law was itself viewed as 
immoral, thus intensifying the opprobrium directed at the actor's behavior." Marc A. 
Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 STAN. L. REv. 51, 58-59 (1980). See 
Clare Elaine Radcliffe, Note, A Duty to Rescue: The Good, The Bad and the Indifferent-the 
Bystander's Dilemma, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 387, 404 (1986) (concluding that a general public 
duty to rescue may be a very necessary tool to combat crowd inertia). 
160. See Viola C. Brady, Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort Law: Implications of 
Research on Altruism, 55 IND. L.J. 551 (1980). Reviewing psychological studies, the Note 
concluded, "These results suggest that a legal duty to aid would result in an increase in 
helping behavior as it would decrease the ambiguity that often surrounds situations of peril 
by providing a norm, or prescription of appropriate conduct." Id. at 557. 
161. Anthony D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 798, 
809 (1975). 
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Imposition of a duty to aid or seek professional help would supple-
ment the overburdened professional rescue mechanisms. 162 
The strongest argument for adopting a duty to aid is that lives, 
such as Kitty Genovese's and the Restatement's blind person, would 
be saved. The question remains whether the creation of the duty to 
aid should encompass tort or criminal liability. Most early commenta-
tors advocated adopting a "duty to aid" rule which imposed criminal 
liability~ 163 Many European countries impose criminal penalties for 
failure to rescue where the rescuer is not placed in peril.l64 The 
Vermont, Minnesota, and Rhode Island statutes follow these European 
models. 
Concerned that rescue would place the rescuer in peril, recent 
statutes provide criminal sanctions for failure to report serious 
criminal activity rather than failure to aid. While these statutes should 
help victims of crime, they do not aid the Restatement's blind person 
or the drowning victim. To compensate for this . oversight, one 
commentator has proposed a duty to notify in all types of cases where 
people witness others in serious danger.16s 
162. Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of 
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 8-9 (1993). 
163. See A. D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 
VA. L. REv. 1273 (1983). At least one commentator urges that when recognizing a legal 
duty to aid, criminal liability is appropriate but compensation is not. Theodore M. Benditt, 
Liabilityfor Failing to Rescue, in JUSTICE, RIGIITS, AND TORT LAW (1983), reprinted in 1 
L. 2 PHIL. 3 (Apr. 1983). 
164. See Alexander W. Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in 
THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND mE LAW (1966). The article also briefly presents the private 
law aspects of the duty to rescue in Europe. Portugal, for example, provides a civil claim 
for damages to a person violently attacked against a bystander who fails to assist. Id at 111. 
165. The model statute creating a duty to notify provides: 
Any person who knows or has reason to know that another person is in serious 
physical danger, and who witnesses this person's predicament, shall notify a police 
agency of the danger as soon as reasonably possible, unless: (a) the person 
witnessing the predicament knows that police agency has already been notified; or 
(b) the person witnessing the predicament is unable to notify a police agency with 
a reasonable effort; or (c) the endangered person appears able to notify a police 
agency without outside help. 
Mark K. Orbeck, Bad Samaritanism and the Duty to Render Aid: A Proposal 19 1. L. REF. 
315, 343 (1985). The model statute provides for criminal liability in the form of fine or 
imprisonment. Most interestingly, it also prevents the criminal statute from being used as a 
tool for enacting civil liability with the following language: "SEC. 3. Proof of a violation 
of this statute does not constitute grounds for imposing civil liability on persons who violate 
the statute." Id 
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In the 1990's, commentators consistently recommended creating 
a tort duty to rescue. One author would impose a "tort duty to help 
in an emergency when reasonable people would do so under similar 
circumstances."I66 Another commentator recommended imposing 
a duty ''to act reasonably under the circumstances unless on balance 
there are recognized policy concerns that militate against imposition 
of that dUty.,,167 A multifactor approach for determining duty in 
good Samaritan cases is tempered by increasing the plaintiff's burden 
of proof on causation in another article. 168 
Most recently, Professor Heyman has developed a liberal-
communitarian theory of justification for imposition of a "duty to aid" 
rule. This theory "holds that moral duties are enforceable only to the 
extent that they can be transformed into duties of right or communi-
166. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A My tho psychological Analysis, 
27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 439, S18 (1994). Professor Galligan proposes leaving to the court 
rather than the jury the question of whether a reasonable person should have acted under the 
circumstances. Additionally, the article lists numerous relevant factors that should be taken 
into consi~eration in answering the question including: 
(I) the number of bystanders present; (2) the degree of attachment, connection, or 
relationship between all the parties, including the bystanders; (3) the costs of 
rescue, including potential risk to the rescuer; (4) the degree of empathy that the 
defendant nonrescuer felt or could reasonably be expected to feel for the person 
who was not rescued; (S) the extent to which contract values were implicated, or 
adversely affected, by iinposing a duty to rescue; and (6) the defendant's interest 
in doing what he chooses. 
Id. at S19. Most of these factors would be evaluated as "circumstances" under the reasonable 
person duty of care to behave as a reasonably prudent person would under the same or 
similar circumstances. . 
167. John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observa-
tions About the Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 
1991 WIS. L. REv. 867, 870 (1991). Professor Adler argues that because the current 
common law "no duty to aid" rule is riddled with exceptions, the adoption of a policy-based 
duty analysis will simplify the task of the court. Furthermore, the proposal "does nothing 
more than to require courts to articulate the real policies that they believe should prevent the 
imposition of liability if any such cases should arise." Id. at 92S. Apparently, the exception 
to liability based upon policy concerns is an ad hoc determination by the court in the 
individual case. This may result in less consistency in the application of the present 
exceptions to the "no duty to aid" rule. 
168. Leonard, supra note 148, at 807. Since potential defendants in this type of case 
may be entitled to greater protection from the initiation of litigation, the author recommends 
increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof. The plaintiff would have "to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence instead of merely by a preponderance of evidence that defendant's action 
was a substantial factor in [causing] plaintiff's loss." Id. at 870. The factors to be 
considered were taken from the Rowland case. 
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ty."169 The duty to aid, therefore, is based upon "the rights of the 
endangered person and on the rescuer's obligation as a member of the 
community. ,,170 This duty to aid, which recognizes that the rescuer 
and victim are not strangers, but members of a broader community, 
is enforceable in both criminal and tort law. It would require: 
a citizen in an emergency situation to take action reasonably necessary to 
prevent either a crime of violence or a substantial risk of death or serious 
bodily hann to another, unless that action would involve a substantial risk 
of death or serious bodily hann to the rescuer or to others. 171 
Most commentators limit the duty to aid to situations involving 
easy rescue where the rescuer can act without risk of injury and with 
little or no inconvenience to himself.172 Additionally, most recent 
commentators rely on a negligence standard of culpability to create 
tort liability for failure to aid. Although varied approaches have been 
proposed by commentators, almost universal agreement exists that the 
common law rule of no duty to aid should be abandoned. 
III. THE PROPOSAL 
The obvious conflict between the law and moral values justifies 
concluding that the "no duty to aid" rule is inappropriate. The public 
was outraged when Kitty Geneovese's neighbors listened to her 
scream for thirty minutes without aiding her. Almost twenty years 
later the public was again incensed when a woman was sexually 
assaulted repeatedly in a New Bedford bar for over an hour while 
patrons watched. Recently, a Michigan woman jumped off a Belle 
Isle bridge to escape from her attacker while a crowd watched without 
aiding. Both criminal sanctions and tort liability should apply to these 
bystanders. 
First, jurisdictions should criminalize the knowing failure to aid 
a victim or report the peril to the authorities. The following is 
proposed language: "Any person who knows that another is in 
serious peril shall summon law enforcement officers or emergency 
169. Steven J. Heyman, Foundations a/the Duty to Rescue, 47 VAND. L. REv. 673, 
742 (1994). The article takes the common law duty to prevent a felony as an obligation 
running not only to the community as a whole, but also to individual citizens. The concept 
of community "protects the rights and promotes the welfare of its members, who in tum have 
obligations toward both the community and their fellow citizens." Id. at 746. 
170. Id. at 742. 
171. Id. at 747-48. 
172. Ames, supra note 143, at 97. 
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medical assistance or shall provide assistance or warning to the 
victim." The statutory duty is stated in the alternative to pennit the 
rescuer to aid without encountering personal peril. Consequently, the 
statute contemplates easy rescue; the duty is satisfied by a phone call 
for emergency assistance. The language encompasses giving 
assistance to anyone in serious peril whether or not criminal activity 
is involved. Appropriate fines and jail sentences should be incorpo-
rated. 
With respect to tort liability, the adoption of a negligence analysis 
is troublesome at a time when tort refonners are attempting to limit 
the "litigation explosion." The purpose behind altering the rule is to 
encourage rescue thereby saving lives and avoiding personal injury, 
not to increase litigation. Accordingly, instead of a tort duty based 
upon a negligence standard, tort culpability based upon intentional 
conduct is more appropriate. The tort liability counterpart would 
provide that: "Any person who intentionally fails to summon, aid or 
assist another in serious peril is liable in damages for the harm caused 
if the failure to act is outrageous under the circumstances."173 
Rather than pennitting a judge or jury to debate the reasonableness of 
the defendant's conduct, the question would simply be whether the 
defendant knew with substantial certainty of the impending peril and 
chose to ignore it. The requirement that the failure to act must be 
outrageous under the circumstances is necessary to limit liability to 
situations where the conduct of the defendant is viewed as intolerable 
by community standards. The concept is borrowed from the tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and emphasizes that every 
failure to aid or seek help is not actionable in tort. "[T]he case is one 
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the 
community would arouse his resentment against the actor and lead 
him to exclaim 'Outrageous! ",174 
173. Only one commentator advocates common law tort liability for a failure to rescue 
one in serious peril based on an intentional and outrageous conduct level of capability. See 
Prentice, supra note 16. at 44. Professor Prentice did not recommend criminal liability but 
suggested that tort liability should be created by United States courts as follows: 
A person who fails to rescue or otherwise lend appropriate assistance to another in 
serious peril will be liable in damages for the harm caused that person if the failure 
to act was (I) intentional, or in deliberate disregard of the consequences. and (2) 
extreme and outrageous under the circumstances. 
Id. At a time when judicial restraint is the political outcry. it appears that advocating a 
statutory approach to the creation of liability is the wiser course. 
174. REsTAlEMENT OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (Supp. 1948). 
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Finally, the "Good Samaritan" statutes of the jurisdiction must be 
reviewed and potentially amended. In a majority of jurisdictions, the 
bystander who goes to the aid of one in peril is liable only for gross 
negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, or in some instances, is 
totally immune from liability for failure to aid in a reasonable 
manner. 175 Thirteen jurisdictions, however, limit protection to 
certain rescuers, most typically medical personnel or professional 
rescuers. 176 In these jurisdictions under the proposed legislation, the 
average citizen without statutory credentials could face criminal 
liability for failure to aid, but will not be afforded immunity from 
liability when rendering aid. Accordingly, for those thirteen jurisdic-
tions, a third component to the proposed legislation is the adoption of 
a "Good Samaritan Statute" providing: "One who renders emergency 
aid is not liable for damages caused by the aid in the absence of gross 
negligence on the part of the aider." A legislative alternative, already 
in effect in some jurisdictions, would be total immunity from suit. 
CONCLUSION 
Current tort reform efforts nationally and at the state level appear 
. to have two general purposes: to reduce the number of cases filed 
. and limit the dollar amount of the judgments. These reform efforts 
value business and insurance industries over the corrective justice 
rights of the injured individual. Public support for these reforms is 
based on negative views of our legal system, the law, and the players: 
jurors, judges and attorneys. 
Aside from educating the public on the jury process, the best way 
to improve public attitude toward the legal system is by law reform 
which reflects community values and adopts morally principled rules. 
Abandoning the common law "no duty to aid" rule is appropriate tort 
175. For excellent tables reviewing the "Good Samaritan" statutes of every state, see 
Robert A. Mason, Good Samaritan Laws - Legal Disarr.ay: An Update, 38 MERCER L. REv. 
1439, 1461-75 (1987) (excellent tables reviewing the Good Samaritan statutes). 
176. Id According to the tables, 13 jurisdictions do not cover all rescuers: Alabama, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, New York, Oregon, and Pennsylvania. Ofthese jurisdictions, Pennsylvania and 
Missouri cover the greatest number of potential rescuers - anyone with training in a 
recognized/approved first aid course. New York is the only jurisdiction that restricts Good 
Samaritan coverage to physicians. Id. at 1446. Michigan's statutes cover a variety of 
rescuers including: physicians, nurses, paramedics, dentists, podiatrists, and restaurant 
owners or employees removing food from the throat of a customer. MICH. COMPo LAWS 
ANN. §§ 691.1501, 691.1502, 691.1522 (West Supp. 1986). 
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reform exemplifying this philosophy. Each state should enact 
legislation which: (1) creates a duty to aid or to report, (2) provides 
criminal sanctions for failure to aid or report, (3) creates civil liability 
for damages resulting from an intentional, outrageous failure to aid or 
report, and (4) creates liability for injuries caused by rescue when the 
conduct constitutes gross negligence. 
It is extremely difficult to defend a legal system containing rules 
which are revolting to any moral sense. Our law should reflect the 
basic moral values we share as humans. A movement toward 
morality-based tort reform could foster a new found respect for the 
law and its keepers. Legislating a duty to aid is a first step in the 
right direction. 
